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Abstrak
Rasyid al-Ghannousyi, pemikir, pembaharu, pemimpin dan pendiri partai politik al-
Nahdhah di Tunisia, tak syak lagi adalah salah seorang pelopor kebangkitan Islam
kontemporer. Keberanian dan kepeloporannyanya berkontribusi dalam
membangkitkan kesadaran dan kepedulian politis Islam terkait dengan akibat-akibat
yang berbahaya dan jahat dari rejim otoriter Zainal Abidin Bin Ali di Tunisia.
Tulisan ini mengeksplorasi kehidupan dan pemikirannya dengan fokus khusus pada
pendekatannya terhadap demokrasi dan kesesuaiannya dengan Islam, kebebasan
publik dan sipil, hak-hal politik warga non-Muslim di Negara Islam dan konsep
legitimasi politik dalam pemikiran politik Islam.
Kata Kunci:
Kebebasan publik dalam Ilsam; dekokrasi dan demokrasi Islam; hak-hak politik
dan legitimasi politik.
A. PEDAHULUAN
1. Al-Ghannousyi’s Stand on
Democracy
The relationship between Islam
and the West and the future prospects
of that relationship has been a source of
controversy for contemporary Muslim
thinkers and activists. Most, if not all,
advocate independence from the West
politically, economically, and
culturally. This stance is based on the
perception that Islamic and western
civilizations are diametrically opposed
as far as their theological and
worldviews are concerned. However,
the Islamists vary as far as their posture
toward the West is concerned. The
radicals have totally rejected the West,
whereas the moderates do not totally
preclude relations with the West but
believe in selective borrowing from it.
Al-Ghannousyiand otherssuch as
Hassan al-Turabi, Muhammad Asad
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and MalekBennabiwere amongthe
foremost supporters of the latter
stance.41 To be more accurate, an
evolution in al-Ghannousyi’s attitude
towards the West is discernible from
one of total rejection of everything that
came from the West to what he
depicted as relative rejection(al-rafd al-
nisbi)or objective interaction(al-
tafa>’ul al-mawdu>’i).42Al-
Ghannousyi views Western thought and
philosophy primarily addressed the
sociological and psychological
problems of the West and offered
solutions applicable to its societies,
which was culture-bound in nature,43
and thus cannot be rejected in their
totality. The Islamists should not
blindly reject everything that comes
from the West. To him a more
constructive and positive interaction
with the West requires Muslims to
borrow from the West that which is
compatible with Islam and to reject
what is incompatible to Islam.
To al-Ghannousyi and other
Islamic thinkers, democracy is not an
Ideology or philosophy to be emulated
by Muslims;it is only as a “political
tool”or instrument for electing,
checking, and rotating political power
and for protecting the civil liberties and
41 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-
Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary Islamic
Thinkers and Activist”, 341.
42 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism, 36.
43 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-
Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary Islamic
Thinkers and Activist”, 342.
basic rights of citizens. He admits that
Muslims need to learn from the West,
which after centuries of struggle has
found the spirit of dialogue. Muslims
need to learn how to build a democratic
pluralistic system from the West, but as
Muslims, he says that democracy is a
part of Islam and he holds
rationalism,humanism, the possibility
of interpretation(ijtihad), the existence
of diversity within Islam, the concept of
popular consultation(syu>ra>), and the
application of the concept of consensus
(ijma’)  which is strongly rooted in
Islam,which he considered tools of
Western democracy compatible with
these Islamic democratic values and
principles. 44
Al-Ghannousyi is implying that
that there is the possibility that
democracy may have Islamic roots.45
Europe benefited from the Islamic
civilization’s heritage of engineering
and mathematics, and as a result
advanced technology. It seems perfectly
reasonable that Europeans may have
‘borrowed’ other ideas as well. In
addition, MalekBennabi in his bookal-
Isla>m wa al-Dimuqra>tiyyah’(Islam
and Democracy) posed the question: Is
there democracy in Islam? For which
Bennabianswered in the affirmative:
Islam is a democratic ideology that
44Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions of
Democracy”, in Middle East Report, July-August (
1993), 2-8.
45 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 104; A.S. Tamimi,
Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat Within
Islamism,8.
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bestows on Muslims political and social
rights and the right to resist
enslavement. He observed that
democracy was practiced in the first
Islamic state of the righteous caliphs
(Khulafa>’ al-Ra>shidu>n); however,
this democracy ceased to exist as the
Umayyads took over the
Caliphate(khila>fah) and transformed it
into a dynastic rule.
Al-Ghannousyi was profoundly
inspired by the ideas of MalekBennabi
on democracy and found them more
mature than those espoused by the
school of SayyidQutb, which rejected
democracy. However, despite his
acceptance of democratic tools, al-
Ghannousyi strongly criticises parts of
Westerndemocracy. First, he points out
the historical problems of general
suffrage. In the beginning only men
with property were allowed to vote and
women’s suffrage was only
accomplished in the first half or the
middle of the 20th century. Second, he
further criticises the Western
democracy of today as “a multi-party
system of governance exercised by an
elite of political leaders”.46It is tempting
to interpret al-Ghannousyi’s
argumentation as a criticism of the
procedural and formal democracy
perspective. If he resents a system
where political power is fought over
within an elite of political leaders, al-
Ghannousyi is approaching a
substantive argumentation. This stance
46 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,86
promotes better accountability from
politicians, and greater public
participation in politics. Although he
embraces the instruments of democracy
like elections and the parliamentary
system, but at the same time al-
Ghannousyi criticizes the philosophies
of Western liberal democracies. It is
especially the secular and nationalistic
values that he rejects.47 For a
democratic regime to succeed it would
need to be founded on sound
philosophies and humanistic values. To
al-Ghannousyi, such a philosophy can
be found in Islam.48 If one moves away
from the understanding that democracy
is a strictly Western concept, the
argumentation of al-Ghannousyi opens
for an Islamic democracy as a
substantive model.
B. HAsil dan Pembahasan
1. His Early Life
Rasyid al-Ghannounsyi was born
on 22 June 1941 in a small village of
Hamma in the province of Gabes near
the southeastern coast of Tunisia during
the turbulence of World War II. Al-
Ghannousyi grew-up under these
conditions of World War II. His father
was treated by the villagers as a teacher
and a Mufti. His maternal uncle, al-
Bashir, had a great influence over his
youngnephew. Al-Bashir was an
enthusiast of Pan-Arabism and its
47 Carsten Thomassen.“Religiostro pa
menneskerettigheter”, 2.
48 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,89.
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leader, Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.
Al-Ghannousyi would listen attentively
to his uncle’s analysis of political
developments during that tumultuous
period. In addition to this early
“political education”, as a child, al-
Ghannousyi witnessed the emergence
of the armed struggle against the French
colonizers. The heavy-handed policy
and ruthlessness of the colonizers
imbued him with a deep aversion
towards colonialism. In addition, his
early readings about the atrocities
committed by Zionist terrorist gangs
against Palestinians in the late 1940s
deeply affected him.49
At the age of eighteen, al-
Ghannousyi left the village for the
capital, Tunis, to pursue his secondary
school education at the prestigious
madrasah al-Zaytunah, where he
obtained a degree in theology. Upon
graduation al-Ghannousyi joined the
Khaldunia Secondary School. The years
al-Ghannousyi spent in al-Zaytunah
exposed him, and made him more
sensitive, to the identity crisis which the
French, and after independence, the
Bourguiba Government, had created
through the extensive secularization of
Tunisia. In the name of modernization,
Bourguibasidelined Tunisia’s Arab–
Islamic heritage replacing it with the
official and elite Francophile culture.
For Bourguiba, Islam represented the
past, and the West was Tunisia’s only
49 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 3-6.
hope for a modern future.50 Al-
Ghannousyi summed this identity crisis
as follows: “I remember we used to feel
like strangers in our own country. We
had been educated as Muslim and
Arabs, while we could see the country
totally moulded by the French
culture”.51
His Arabic education at al-
Zaytuna naturally barred him from
entering the French-speaking
University at home, so in 1964 he went
to Damascus where he enrolled in the
Faculty of Letters wherein he
studiedphilosophy. His philosophical
studies deeply influenced his thought,
and its impact was discernible in his
writings and mode of thinking. As a
student he briefly joined a secular Pan-
Arab Party, the Syrian Nationalist
Social Party, which was influenced by
Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. While in
Syria,he also established close contact
with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
(Syrian Ikhwa>nulMuslimi>n), which
resulted in his strong attachment to the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which he subsequently “adopted in its
totality”.52 In 1968 al-Ghannousyi
graduated with a master’s degree in
philosophy, and left for France to
further his studies at the Sorbonne.
50 John Esposito, The Islamic Treat, Myth and
Reality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),
153.
51 Abdul Wahhab al-Affendi, “ The Long March
Forward ” in Inquiry, (London: 1987),124.
52 Linda G. Jones, “Portrait of Rashid al-
Ghannousyi” in Middle East Report, (Washington
D.C., 1988), 170.
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However, his studies at the Sorbonne
University had to be cut short because
of family difficulties, and he returned
home in 1969 and taught philosophy in
a secondary school.53
While teaching philosophy, al-
Ghannousyi Islamizedthe curriculum
which to him reflected a materialistic
Western philosophical bias as presented
in Marxism, Freudianism, Darwinism
and existentialism. To al-Ghannousyi,
the curriculum primarily addressed the
psychological and sociological issues of
Western societies and was not suited for
the problems faced by Islamic societies.
In his critical analysis, he presented
Islam as an alternative to his young
students throughout the 1970s54 and as
his students went to university, his
ideas began to take root.
2. Al-Ghannousyi’s
Involvement in the Islamic
Movement
The history of the contemporary
Islamic movement in Tunisia is known
as the HarakahAn-Nahdah(The
Renaissance Movement).55It was first
founded in 1970 as al-Jama’ah al-
53 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,4.
54 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-
Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary Islamic
Thinkers and Activist”, in Contemporary Islamic
Political Thought: A Study of Eleven Islamic
Thinkers, (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic
University Malaysia, 2009), 338.
55 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, (Colorado:
Westview Press, 1998), 7.
Isla>miyyah(The Islamic Group), the
same movement was renamed to
Harakah al-Ittija>h al-Isla>mi or
Islamic Tendency/Trend Movement
(ITM)in 1981. The movement finally
settled on the name Hizbial-Nahdahin
1988, removing religious connections
from the name after pressure from the
government. Despite the resignation of
a few of its leaders with the formation
of the new group, the majority of its
members remained loyal to Al-
Nahdahmaking it the main oppositional
force in Tunisia .56
From the mid-60s the Al-Zaituna
Mosque served as a gathering place for
traditional scholars avoiding
Bourguiba’s secularization
policies57which aimed at modernising
Tunisia and weaken the religious
influence in the country; believing the
road to modernization was through
secularism.Some of these scholars held
discussion circles. It was through this
means that the founding figuresRasyid
al-Ghannousyi, Abdul Fatah Mourou
and Ahmida al-Naifer met.58Due to the
government ban of such organizations,
the group (al-Jama’ah) remained
underground, but its leaders operated
under the platform of a government-
sponsored society called “The Society
for the Preservation of the Holy
56 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 7.
57 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 67.
58 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 16.
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Qur’an”. According to al-Ghannousyi,
they acted as a religious and cultural
response to Bourguiba’s anti-religious
and pro-Western policies.59 The
political,social,economic and cultural
backwardness of the Tunisian society,
which was heavily influenced by the
West, as well as its loss of identity and
morals, called for a return to Islam.60
This continuous removal from Arab and
Muslim culture and identity would
explain why many turned to the
Islamists. Al-Ghannousyi and his
colleagues used aforementioned
platform with the express desire to
rebuild the “Arab-Muslim character” of
Tunisian society, drawing from the
teachings of such Muslim revivalists as
Abu ‘Ala al-Maududi, Hassan al-Banna
and SayyidQutb. However, as soon as
the government found out about the
activities of that cell, it expelled its
members. This signalled the beginning
of a long relation of animosity with
theBourguiba government.
Bourguiba was a popular leading
independence-figure and as such there
was little opposition when he seized
power in 1956. He is still regarded by
many as a leader without a strong
political direction. This can be seen in
the various natures and directions of his
policies. When for instance the socialist
experiment failed,Bourguiba tried an
‘open door’policy through economic
59 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 12.
60 John Esposito, The Islamic Treat, Myth and
Reality, 163.
liberalization. These shifts in policy
showed that Bourguiba lacked
ideological roots in politics, which
clearly gave the president a legitimacy
problem.
Additionally, when the shifting
policies did not work, and poverty and
unemployment rates were continuously
rising, the confidence in the
government was in decline as the crisis
of efficiency spread. With
unemployment rates as high as 25% of
the population, most of whom were
youths under the age 20,61 the Islamists
increasingly became a viable alternative
government. The Islamists grasped the
opportunity by participating in the 1978
demonstration of the General Union of
Tunisian Workers (UGTT), which
aimed at defending workers’ rights and
propagating an Islamic policy of
development. The government
deployed its military to stop the
demonstrations, which resulted in a
significant shift of public support from
the government to the Islamists.
In 1979 the movement’s support
was wider than anyone had expected.
The movement’s journal al-Ma’rifah
had increased from 6000 reviews in
1971 to 25000 review in 1979.62 The
movement leaders felt they had to
reconsider their activity and called for a
61 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 74.
62 Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia
Since Independence”, in Third World Quarterly,
vol.10, no2. (1988), 600.
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conference to discuss and decide on the
movement’s future.63 70 of the most
prominent members attended and in
August, 1979, agreed upon a
constitution for their secret association
(MIT). Rasyid al-Ghannousyi was
elected president(Amir) and a detailed
structure for the whole organization
was worked out.
As 1980 drew to a close and 1981
began, two incidentsaffected the policy
of the movement(ITM), and in the
month of December 1980 two of its
members were arrested, and the
movement calculated that it was only a
matter of time before the government
and the police would know about the
movement’s activities and take action.
However, in the same year, the new
Prime Minister, Mr.Mazali,who they
regarded  as a political liberalist was
appointed and encouraged
Bourguibatoopen up for political
pluralism in April 1981.64 This event
resulted in the movement’s (MIT) push
toward openness. It applied for official
recognition as a political party in June
1981 with great expectations.65This
political openness however did not last
long and in autumnof 1981, 61 of the
movement’s leaders werearrested.66
63 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 34.
64 Emma C. Murphy, Economic and Political
Change in Tunisia, (Basingstoke: MacMillan
Press, 1999), 63.
65 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 38.
66 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
MIT was not recognized as a political
party but other opposition parties were
tolerated. Still, these parties had to wait
until 1983/1984 to be fully
recognized.67 Nevertheless, due to
heavy loans from the World Bank, and
to fulfil the World Bank’s requirement
for new loans, in 1983 the government
cut the state subsidies on wheat, which
doubled the price of bread and pasta
products.68 This led to ‘bread riots’ in
January 1984 throughout
Tunisia.69Although the riots were
essentially a popular response to the
socio-economic situation,70the Islamists
managed to turn this situation to their
advantage; Islamists rhetoric was used
in the demonstrations and support for
Islam was massive.
To calm the situation the Prime
Minister Mazali managed to convince
President Bourguiba to free most of the
Islamists arrested in 1981.71 The Mazali
relaxed policy toward the Islamists
group was to neutralize the Islamists
Africa, 87. Marion Boulby, “The Islamic
Challenge: Tunisia Since Independence”, 609.
67 Emma C. Murphy, Economic and Political
Change in Tunisia,64.
68 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:
Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia,
(Bergen: University of Bergen, 2000), 89.
69 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 47.
70Gudrun Kramer, “The Integration of the
Integrists: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan
and Tunisia” in GhassanSalame(ed.), Democracy
Without Democrat? The Renewal of Politics in
Muslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers,
1994), 201.
71 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:
Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 89.
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while undermining the worker’s union
(UGTT).72 But President Bourguiba did
not trust the Islamists (MIT) who by
that time was clearly the strongest
opposition force in Tunisia. This led to
the ousting of Prime MinisterMazali in
1986 and the Islamists were again put
under heavy repression,73and the new
Prime Minister ZainalAbidinBin Ali
was appointed. In March 1987, the
repression culminated in a major crack-
down on ITM where hundreds were
arrested and accused of planning to
overthrow the Tunisian government.74
The New Prime Minister, Ben
Ali however, believed Bourguiba had
failed to implement democracy in
Tunisia and set forth a bloodless coup
d’etat on Novermber 7th 1987, which
overthrew the Bourguiba presidency.
Ben Ali became President and promised
he would democratize Tunisia. The new
President also accused his predecessor
of disregarding the Arab and Islamic
identity of Tunisia, which would now
be restored under a new regime,75 and
he announced a wish for political
reconciliation and illustrated this by
releasing nearly all Islamist prisoners
72 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall of
Islamist Movement in Tunisia”, Laura Guazzone
(ed), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of
Islamist Movements in Contemporary Arab
World, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), 107.
73 Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia
Since Independence”, 610.
74 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:
Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 93.
75 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 64.
connected to MIT.76 This was followed
by a mutual acceptance between MIT
and the new ruler(Ben Ali). They
cooperated with the PacteNationale, an
expression of political consensus
among all political groups aimed at
getting Tunisia back on tract.77 The
MIT was represented in the High
Islamic Council, a government
appointed body that dealt with all
religious matters in a consultative
manner. The Islamic student
organization was also legalized, but an
official recognition of MIT was still put
on hold.78
The ITM tried hard to win the
confidence of the Ben Ali government.
They even changed their name from
ITM to Hizbial-Nahdah(The
Renaissance Party) to fulfil the
government’s requirements that no
political party could be based on
religious values.79 Nevertheless, al-
Nahdah was forbidden to participate as
a political party in the 1989 elections.
Instead they participated and contested
as independent Islamist candidates80
76 Marit Tjomsland, This but also the other:
Expressions of the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 95
77 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall of
Islamist Movement in Tunisia”, 109. Marit
Tjomsland, This but also the other: Expressions of
the Islamic Trend in Tunisia, 95.
78 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall of
Islamist Movement in Tunisia”, 110.
79 Abdul Baki Hermassi, “The Rise and the Fall of
Islamist Movement in Tunisia”, 111. Mohamed
.E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of Islam: A Case
Study of Tunisia, 64.
80 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 100.
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covering 20 of a total of 25
constituencies(La Presse:1989b).
According to official results given to La
Presse, the government party (RCD)
obtained 34% of the votes, the
independent candidates won 54% of the
votes and the rest of the official parties
obtained approximately 5% support(La
Presse. 1989a). Al-Nahdah’s support in
the major cities,including Tunis, was
around 40% of the votes. Regardless of
whether the election results were
accurate or not, they strongly indicated
that the Islamic groups had become an
established oppositional force in
Tunisia, rendering then a threat to Ben
Ali’s regime. Two factors seemed to
have influenced the government’s
decision: the impressive performance of
al-Ghannousyi’s candidates in the
national election which highlighted al-
Nahdah’s political potential, and the
victory of the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS) in the 1989 municipal elections in
Algeria. These developments clued
President Ben Ali and many Muslim
rulers to the dangers posed by
Islamists.81
3. Al-Ghannousyi’s Exile
Shortly after, themovement’s
name changed to al-Fajr but soon after
the government put an end to this new
movement. Al-Ghannousyi went into
exile to London in May 1989. In his
exile, al-Ghannousyi dedicated most of
81 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 101.
his energy to the cause of da’wah and
political activism.However, the fate of
Islamists in Tunisia was grim. The
Tunisian government took measures to
control Islam by installing government
appointed imams andclosing the
mosque after prayers. Al-Nahdah’s
members were arrested and their
families and sympathisers were
eliminated. By 1992 Amnesty
International reported that at least 8000
followers of al-Nahdah were
imprisoned in Tunisia.82 The
government was now clearly intolerant
of any public dissent
(Shahin.1997:103).83 The announced
electoral reform of 1994
(Dunn.1996:162) resulted in little
change. Even though 19 seats in
parliament were now reserved for the
opposition parties, the opposition was
unableto win any additional seats.
Moreover, it seems like Ben Ali
strengthened his position as an
autocratic President when arresting the
former head of the Tunisian League for
Human Right Muncif al-Marzuqi, when
trying to challenge Ben Ali for
President.84After eliminating his
opponent, Ben Ali won the usual
99.91% of votes in the 1994 elections.
82 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 101.
83 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 103.
84 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa, 103.
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Ever since the beginning of the
1990s it has been impossible for al-
Nahdah to act openlyinTunisia. Al-
Nahdah has continued its work by
holding conferences abroad. In 1995
they restructured the organization and
redefined its policy towards the
Tunisian regime. Most importantly,
they stressed their non-violent nature
and decided working for the prevention
of further political polarization in
society by fighting for political rights of
the entire Tunisian society. Living in
exile in London,Rasyid Ghannousy
iwas re-elected leader of al-Nahdah at
this conference with only 52% of the
votes.85 He established an al-Nahdah
office in London, and constantly travels
to give lectures and interviews about
the al-Nahdah policy. He maintained
regular contact with other Islamist
groups, but argues for variations in
Islamist policy in that different
countries requires solutions adjusted to
their specific context(Interview with the
author, June 2003).
4. Al-Ghannousyi’s Political
Thought
During the 1970s and 1980s
political ideas such as public freedom
and Islamic democracy was never an
issuefor Islamist groups in Tunisia. Al-
Ghannousyi and his colleagues
emphasized the question of education
and morality.86 Al-Ghannousyi wanted
85 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,72.
86 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
an educational system that was Arab
instead of Frenchthat emphasized on
religious education. It was through
close contact with the Algerian Muslim
intellectual and thinkerMalekBennabi,
who al-Ghannousyi considered “a
pillar of Islamic thought and a
revivalist of IbnKhaldun’s Islamic
rationalism”.87To al-Ghannousyi,
Bennabi’smethodology was different
from what had been accepted in
orthodox Islamic methodology which
envisioned reality as derived solely
from the religious text.88These
experiences had a profound impact on
al-Ghannousyi who came to conceive
Islamic rationalism as a symbiosis of
reason and revelation.
This new outlook sensitized al-
Ghannousyi to some of the major
deficiencies in the traditional Islamic
movement. The sources of this
deficiency lay within the traditional
Islamic movement itself. Al-
Ghannousyi cited two events of the
deliberating issues of the Tunisian
society at that time, namely the issues
of the ‘working class ’and the ‘role and
position of women’ in society. To
Ghannousyi, the Islamists in Tunisia
have failed to mobilize the working
class; leaving the door wide open for
the proponents of other ideologies to
dominate this sector. Likewise, al-
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 102.
87 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,31.
88 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-
Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary Islamic
Thinkers and Activist”, 338.
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Ghannousyi argued that the influence of
the Islamists on the female sector has
also been restricted for the same reason.
The reason behind these failures can be
attributed to the Islamists’ ignorance
and insensitivity regarding the political
and social problems of the working
class and lack of awareness and
insensitivity toward the oppression,
degradation, restrictions of women’s
role inthe life of society that they have
endured during the long centuries of
decline. It was natural that women
became influenced by the enticements
of the West, because they had been
suffering under the yoke of an
oppressive, false Islam, sustained by the
silence of the “men of religion”.89 What
the Muslim woman needed was a
liberation movement to restore her to
herself and to her innate nature as a
guardian of the heritage of mankind and
a partner of man in liberating herself
and him from the forces of exploitation.
According to al-Ghannousyi, the
Islamists group must also breakaway
from the traditional belief that the
workers union such as ‘General Union
of Tunisian Workers(UGTT)’ in
Tunisia was alien to the Islamic view of
life which disapproves of class conflict
and bears no pretence of absolute
quality in material status.
Due to this daring thought of al-
Ghannousyi the Tunisian workers
unions were attracted to his ideas and
89 Al-Fateh A. Abdelsalam, “Rashid al-
Ghannousyi: Portrait of a Contemporary Islamic
Thinkers and Activist”, 339.
many of the Tunisian workers were
drawn to al-Ghannousyi’s
message.Over the next few years the
Islamic movement became a major
force in the UGTT as more and more
rural and urban workers openly
sympathized with the Islamists. That
was a daring move which put al-
Ghannousyiand his movement in a class
of their own. Although within the
period of 1970-78, the Islamic
movement in Tunisia remained focused
on the religio-cultural transformation of
society, however, in the late seventies
as a result of the trade union’s
demonstrations, the movement had to
focus more seriously on political issues
in reaction to the domestic situation in
Tunisia. The Islamists found
themselves forced to rethink their ideas
and strategy. It was an uphill task for
al-Ghannousyi and his movement in
addressing current issues of workers’
rights, jobs, wages, poverty,
westernization versus a more authentic
national and cultural identity,
democracy, political participation and
political freedom were raised; thus
presenting a living Islam rather than the
“Museum Islam”.
According to al-Ghannousyi, this
shift was a necessary step for the
movement to “link with the realities of
the Tunisian society”. These
circumstances compelled him and the
movement to emphasize two axes: the
axis of identity and the axis of civil
liberty. The movement aimed to defend
Islam as an identity, not only a state or
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way of life, and in order to fight for the
principle of civil liberties the Islamic
movement found it necessary to co-
operate with other oppositional forces
within Tunisia(Interview with al-
Shira.1994:3).
5. Public and Civil Liberties
For the Tunisian government and
its ruling Destourian Socialist Party,
Islamism was an anathema to their
espousal of “modernity” and
“progress”. By July 1981, the Tunisian
regime moved to round up al-
Ghannousyi and all known leaders and
members of the ITM and imprisoned
them. Al-Ghannousyi remained in
prison from 1981 to 1984.90 While in
prison, he memorized the Qur’an,
studied some works on tafsir and fiqh,
and completed the draft of his best
known book “al-Hurriyah al-‘Ammah fi
al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah” (Public
Liberties in the Islamic State), which he
completed later on while living in exile
in London. It was published in 1993 by
the Centre of Arab Unity Studies in
Beirut.
According to al-Ghannousyi, the
mission of his movement is to win the
struggle for civil liberties(Tunisian
Insight.1997).In one of his most recent
articles entitled “Freedom First”, al-
Ghannousyiattempted to demonstrate
the relationship between the democratic
process and liberty. Al-Ghannousyi
considers individual liberties as the
90 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 103.
cornerstone of governance
(http://www.aljazeera net.
12/21/2009).To support his argument,
he asserted that Yusuf al-Qaradawi
believed that “liberty” must take
precedent even over applications of
Islamic belief as embodied in Islamic
law(syari’ah),and according to him, this
freedom is achieved through religion. In
his view, Islam was revealed to
guarantee man’s essential needs.91Such
guarantees given through Islam
constitute, according to al-Ghannousyi,
the general framework of human rights.
In establishing and refining a
legal framework for man’s freedom, al-
Ghannousyi credits al-Shatibi(d.1388
A.D.) for elaborating this framework in
his book al-Muwafaqat, which sets out
the Maqasid al-Syari’ah(the objective
of Islamic law) as being the realization
of the main interest of humanity. These
interests are classified into daruriyat
(essential needs), hajiyat (important,
but not essential needs), and
tahsiniyat(ameliorative needs). The first
class consists of guarantees necessary
for the protection of faith, life, reason,
progeny, and wealth. The idea is that
Islam, as a religion, was revealed for
the purpose of guaranteeing and
preserving man’s essential needs. The
guarantees provided by Islam for
accomplishing this end constitute the
general framework of human rights,
including the right to choose a faith, the
right to life, the right to education, the
91 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism, 76.
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right to free expression, the right to
have a family, and the right to own
property.92
Al-Ghannousyiopines that the
first and most important human right
guaranteed by Islam is the freedom of
belief, which he defines as the
individual’s right to choose his faith
free from any compulsion. He explains
that by virtue of being a God-given
right, freedom of choice is sanctified
and guaranteed by Islamic
law(shari>’ah). The golden rule in this
matter, he points out, is found in the
Qur’anic verse: “No compulsion in
religion” (QS 2:256). It is from this rule
that the rights of non-Muslims in an
Islamic state derive legitimacy. Al-
Ghannousyi addresses this topic in
detail in his book titled ‘Huqu>qGhayr
al-Muslimi>n fi> al-Mujtama’ al-
Isla>mi(The Right to Nationality Status
of Non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim
Nation)’ published by the Islamic
Foundation in America in 1990.
Al-Ghannousyi is quite negative
to the liberal view on freedom.
According to him, liberties in the West
are guaranteed through state
institutions, but they are only formal, he
argues. Man is given the theoretical
right to do various things, but he is not
given any real power to fulfil these
rights. He criticizes the way a limited
92 Rashid al-Ghannousyi, “The Participation of
Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government”, in
AzzamTamimi (ed.), Power Sharing Islam,
(London: Library of Muslim World Publications,
1993), 43.
group of citizens have monopolized
power, wealth, and culture.93 This
follows the critique given by the New
Left, Marxists and the substantive
democracy perspective on liberalism.
Power and wealth is gathered in the
hands of a small group of elites.
Equality and total freedom is not really
achieved for the rest of the citizens.
Hence,al-Ghannousyi also argues
against what he calls ‘negative
freedom’.This liberal view saw the need
to secure citizens from the state. Al-
Ghannousyi holds a more ‘positive
concept of freedom’. He is compared to
Kant who held that freedom is the
ability to realize oneself. Choices are
connected to obedience toward moral
law.94 In comparison, al-Ghannousyi
sees the moral law as obedience to
Islam. In his version, freedom is
achieved through servitude to God. He
believes the main message in Islam is to
guarantee human rights.95 The objective
of Islamic law (shari>’ah) is meant to
serve the interest of human beings, says
al-Ghannousyi. Religion depends on
true faith and free will, thus the starting
point of Islamic human rights is the
freedom of belief.96 In his book “Public
93 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,73
94 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,75.
95 Carsten Thomassen.“Religiostro pa
menneskerettigheter”. Interview with Rashid
Ghannouchi for 3. Verden Magasinet X, 6/98.
Found at: www.solidaritetshuset.
Org/x/9806/islam.htm (1998), 1.
96 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 107.
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Liberties in the Islamic State” he lists
seven basic rights:Equality(all citizens
are equal before the law), freedom to
practice religious worship, freedom to
propagatereligions other than Islam,
freedom and dignity of the human
being, freedom of thought and
expression, and freedom of private
ownership and social
rights(employment, health care and
social security).97 These values are in
accordance with democratic values. The
question is whether they are respected
within the Islamic democracy…?.
6. Al-Ghannousyi’s
Conception of Islamic
Democracy
The most important questions
that revolve around the compatibility of
Islam and democracy are the potential
resources of the Islamic tradition to
operate effectively to meet the demand
for popular democratic participation in
the contemporary political system. The
Qur’an and the Syari’ah only provide
some fundamental principles pertaining
to the political and constitutional affairs
of Muslims. In other words, the
syari’ah does not prescribe any uniform
system of government for Muslim
countries. Al-Ghannousyi holds the
view that “Islam does not include a
political system”,98 however, he
97 Mohamed .E, Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia, 108.
98 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).
Interview  with Rashid Ghannousyi. Found at:
www.turkishdaily
believes “there are political guidelines
and values found in Islam, but there is
no detailed political system to
follow”.99 The syari’ah has refrain from
providing detailed regulations for all
the changing requirements of Muslim
social existence. According to al-
Ghannousyi, God has left the forming
of a political system to the people, as
long as they do not separate religion
completely from politics. He said
“politics should be inspired by Islamic
values. These values inspired by the
syari’ah should have an important
impact on political conduct”.100
The issue of legislation in a state
based on Islamic law (syari’ah) relates
to many problems of administration
which are not touched upon by the
Islamic law.It is believed that with the
passage of time the practical form of
government for any country will
naturally change and therefore the
Islamic law (syari’ah) has left it to the
community(ummah) to develop relevant
forms of political and governmental
systems through an exercise of
independent reasoning (ijtihad) in
consonance with the spirit of the law
and the best interest of the nation.101 In
news.com/tdn/old_editions/11_13_96/feature.h
tm
99Nina Eikesaeth, Islamism and Democracy:
Is the Tunisian al-Nahdah and Example of
Democratic Islamist Movement? (Oslo:
University Oslo, 2003), 78.
100Nina Eikesaeth, Islamism and Democracy:
Is the Tunisian al-Nahdah and Example of
Democratic Islamist Movement? (Oslo:
University Oslo, 2003),78.
101LukmanThaib, Democratic Values in the
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matters affecting the communal aspect
of community life, no legislation
reasoning or decision can be left to the
discretion of individuals, but the
decision must be based on a definite
consensus(ijma’) of the whole
community(ummah).This can be
implemented through the process of
modern forms of public participation
such as referendums or general
elections.This indicates that Islam only
provides broad principles and a general
framework in the area of worldly
interactions(mu’a>malah) which makes
it possible for the Muslim community
to evolve and meet the needs of every
age.
According to al-Ghannousyi,
after a hundred over years of conflict
resolutions, Western communities have
found that their differences can be
solved through political means instead
of bloody war. Muslims are
increasingly adopting democracy.102Al-
Ghannousyi’s theory of compatibility
between Islam and democracy stems
from the assumption that the
government in Islam embodies a
civilian authority that is answerable to
the public. It would follow that there
would be no place for theocracy in
Islam because policy-makers could, and
ought to, be opposed or criticized by
individuals or groups if their policy-
making were thought to be ill-advised
Islamic Political System & Muslim Politics in
Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Printed by UM
Publishers, 2012), 5.
102 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).
or misguided.103 Stemming from the
concept of enjoining good and
forbidding evil (al-amrbilma'ruf wan-
nahyu‘anilmunkar) is the conviction
that standing up to the authorities when
they go wrong, or endeavouring to
correct them, is one of the most
important duties in Islam.
7. Al-Ghannousyi’s Political
System Based on Values
Al-Ghannousyi believed that
although Islam does not provided a
detailed political system to follow;
there are nonetheless political
guidelines and principles such as
popular consultation (shu>ra>),
majority rule (al-hukmu al-
aghla>biyyah), popular sovereignty
(al-siya>dah) and maqa>sid al-
shari>’ahwith its five principles.
According to him, Islam includes these
several principles that are shared with
democratic values in the modern
governmental system. These democratic
values in Islam are inspired by the
syari’ah and should have an important
impact on political conduct.
The Islamic system of
government, which he proclaims to be
the ultimate project of the modern
Islamic movement, is said by him to be
characteristically bound by a set of
divine guidelines. It is a system that is
aimed at achieving justice and peace in
the world. The philosophy behind this
103 A.S. Tamimi, Rashid Ghannousyi: A Democrat
Within Islamism,90.
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is that Islam is God’s final Word to
humanity, and is therefore, by
necessity, a comprehensive and global
message of mercy and justice to all
mankind. An important component of
this message is the body of laws known
as syari’ah(Islamic law).
Al-Ghannousyi explains that
syari’ah, which he sometimes defines
as a set of broad guidelines as opposed
to a body of laws, is entirely fair and
merciful, having been revealed by God
for the purpose of serving and guarding
the interests of humanity.104 As such,
Islamic law(syari’ah)transcends the
limits of time and place. This is the
underpinning of the science of Islamic
jurisprudence (‘ilmusu>l al-fiqh)
founded by Imam al-Shafi>’I (d.819),
and the science of purposes (‘ilm al-
maqa>sid), founded by Imam al-
Shati>bi (d.1388). Both of these
sciences are of crucial importance to al-
Ghannousyi in his endeavour to find
within Islamic law itself the precepts of
an Islamic democratic system of
governance. This is crucial simply
because no political theory can be
considered Islamic if formulated
outside the domain of Islamic law
(syari’ah). It would simply be
illegitimate from an Islamic point of
view.
To avoid confusion between the
precepts of an Islamic democratic
104 Rashid Ghannousyi , “The Basic Principles of
an Islamic State”, a paper presented to
Symposium on Christian-Islamic Dialogue,
(Germany, June 1994), 7.
system of governance and the human
rights in Islamic law, there is a need to
compare how Larry Diamond, co-editor
of the Journal of Democracy, and
Leonardo Morlino, a specialist in
comparative politics at the University
of Florence, ascribe seven features to
any democracy: individual freedom and
civil liberties; rule of law; sovereignty
resting upon the people; equality of all
citizens before the law; vertical and
horizontal accountability for
government officials; transparency of
the ruling system to the demands of the
citizens; and equality of opportunity for
citizens..105 This approach is very
important to Western liberal
democracy, since it emphasizes civil
liberties, human rights and
freedoms,instead of over-reliance on
elections and the formal institutions of
the state (Robert A. Dahl.1998:76). If
observed carefully, these Western
Liberal democracy features are equal to
al-Shatibi’s theory of a requirement or
interest(maslahah) and theory of the
objectives of al-shari>’ah(maqa>sid
al-shari>’ah),which according to him
serves to protect five major exigencies:
faith, life, mind, progeny and property.
Drawing on al-Shatibi, al-
Ghannousyi refers to guidelines and
regulations the objective of which is the
maintenance of basic human interests
and protecting them from infringement
or corruption. “These guidelines and
105 Larry Diamond, Democracy in Developing
Countries, (London: Andamantine Press, 1988),
218-260.
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regulations together form a framework,
which is spacious enough to comprise
all known fundamental rights such as
the right to life, to freedom of choice,to
education, to owning property, and to
participate in public life, and in the
establishment of a just system of
government”.106 This indicated that al-
Ghannousyi agreed to the view that
many of the Islamic values are shared
with democratic values. In addition to
sovereignty of the people there are
“political pluralism, protecting minority
rights and tolerance, political power
based on free elections and respecting
basic rights and freedoms”.107Based on
these shared values between Islam and
democracy many Western scholars who
have learned the objectives of the
Islamic law (maqa>sid al-shari>’ah)
and the democratic discourse through
Islamic concepts such as popular
consultation(shu>ra>), public
consensus(ijma>l-ummah), the majority
principle for decision-making(al-hukm
al-aghla>biyyah), and independent
interpretive judgment(ijtiha>d) have
concluded that Islam is not only
compatible with democracy but that a
form of democracy was practiced prior
to Abbasid rule.Based on this form of
reasoning, GudrumKrame, chair of the
Institute of Islamic Studies at the Free
University in Berlin, concluded that the
central stream in Islam “has come to
106 Rashid Ghannousyi, “Human Rights in Islam”,
a paper presented to a Symposium of the
Association of Muslim Lawyers,(Birmingham,
June 18, 1995).
107 Turkish Daily News (13 November 1996).
accept crucial elements of political
democracy; pluralism, political
participation, governmental
accountability, the rule of law, and the
protection of human rights”.108 In her
opinion, the Muslim approach to human
rights and freedom as mentioned in al-
Shatibi’sconcept on the objectives of
Islamic law(maqa>sid al-shari>’ah) is
more advanced than many Westerners
acknowledge.
a. Political Rights and
Legitimacy
In his book of al-Hurriyah al-
‘A<mmah fi> al-Dawlah al-
Isla>miyyah, al-Ghannousyi analysed a
number of basic principles political
thought of a contemporary “Islamic
State”. Foremost among these are the
political right of a citizen and the
political legitimacy in Islam. Because
of their centrality to his political
thought, these two concepts warrant
some analysis.
It is important to understand that in
an Islamic political system, through the
constitutional idea of the popular
Caliphate and the principle
ofsyu>ra(popular consultation), the
Islamic law(shari>’ah) confers upon all
adult Muslims, with the possible
exception of some convicted criminals,
equal political rights, irrespective of
race, colour, religion, language and
socio-economic status. The right to
108 Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions of
Democracy”.
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participate in discussion, or to be
consulted over all major public issues
not categorically settled by the revealed
text (nusu>s), for example, is only one
of those universally guaranteed political
rights. This equality gave to
citizens(Muslim ummah) of a Muslim
or an Islamic state the right to
participate in the decision-making
process of the Islamic state. The basic
reason for popular participation in the
decision-making process of the Islamic
government is that political rights, like
almost all other rights guaranteed by the
Islamic law(shari>’ah), entail
numerous religious and legal
obligations.
The fulfilment of these obligations
makes political participation itself an
obligation of the community(Muslim
ummah). One main obligation is to
ensure that the affairs of the worldly
kingdom are conducted in accordance
with the divine law(shari>’ah); as this
constitutes the primary purpose of the
covenants of Islam. Since the
application of the Islamic law
shari>’ah represent both a personal and
a collective obligation upon Muslims,
for that reason it is essential for every
citizen to participate in the decision-
making process. From this perspective,
political participation in Islam
constitutes both an exercise of rights
and a fulfilment of religious
obligations. The ideal method for such
political participation, it may seem, is
that of direct popular consultation
(general election).
Human experience, however, has
shown that direct popular participation
in decision-making is possible only in
small communities as the problem of
size makes direct popular participation
impossible. The obstacle of a large
territory and sizeable population make
some sort of representative government
the available practical option to ensure
that participation in the decision-
making process in any large state is
effective. In fact, the idea of
government by representation in Islam
is derived from this necessity. The term
“waka>lah”(representation) according
to the Islamic law(shari>’ah) means:
“The appointment of a deputy for the
purpose of acting on one’s behalf
concerning matters in which
representation is legally valid”.109 This
definition covers all types of
representation including political
representation.
With regard to the right of
nationality of non-Muslim citizens in an
Islamic state, al-Ghannousyi started his
discourse with a brief outline of the
essential components comprising the
principles of justice,equity,security, and
community and the protection granted
to non-Muslims citizen in a Muslim
state as rights embodied in the divine
law. There is one nationality for those
who live in an Islamic state, be they
Muslims or non-Muslims. They all
enjoy three inviolable rights; the first of
109 Abdul Wahhab Khallaf,Masha>dir Tasyri’ al-
Isla>mi  Fi> Ma>la Nass Fi>hi, (Kuweit: Dar al-
Qalam, 1970), 166.
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these rights is equality, which is
positive and comprehensive regardless
of race,ethnic origin, colour, social
status or creed. The second right is
freedom, which encompasses freedom
of thought and freedom of belief
including the right of non-Muslims in a
Muslim state to build churches,temples,
monasteries,synagogues, and so on. The
third right is the freedom of movement
including the right to establish schools
and religious institutions.110
Apart from the position of head
of state, Muslim writers disagree on
which positions or which public
functions should be allowed or denied
to non-Muslims in an Islamic state. Al-
Ghannousyi rejected the stance of
scholars who argued that non-Muslim
citizens are not eligible to hold senior
positions in the Islamic state.111 It
seems that al-Ghannousyi was of the
opinion that as long as non-Muslim
citizens have the right to participate in
elections at all levels, it follows that
they qualify to occupy any positions in
the state except that of the head of
state.112
8. Legitimacy
The term of legitimacy has been
110 Rashid Ghannousyi, The Right to Nationality
Status of Non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim
Nation, (North America: The Islamic Foundation
of America, 1990), 60-61.
111 Said Hawa, Al-Madkhal Ila> Dakwah al-
Ikhwa>n al-Muslimi>n, (Jordan: Amman
Publishers, 1979), 17.
112 Rashid Ghannousyi, The Right to Nationality
Status of Non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim
Nation, 85.
defined as “a sovereign or his rights to
rule” (Webster. 1961:141). A faction in
France which after the revolution of
1830 continued to support the claims of
the elder line of the House of Bourbon
as the legitimate sovereign by divine
rights, came to be known as
“legitimist”.113 In England, the word
legitimist is applied to any supporter of
monarchy by hereditary right as against
any other title. In International politics,
legitimacy was the principle invoked at
the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) to
justify the restoration of countries and
ruling families abolished or
dispossessed during the epoch of the
French Revolution and Napoleon, a
policy with which the names of
Talleyrand and Matternich are
associated.114
The question of the legitimacy of
political authority and government in
the Muslim world was never
realistically solved. Rulers and wielders
of power never succeeded in gaining
full and total recognition of the legists,
and if they did. It was out of
“necessity” and expediency. The reason
for this was due to the reluctance to
adapt to the changes in the body politic
of the early Islamic community and the
inability to achieve a synthesis between
the eternal principles of Islam and
social changes.
113 Carl J. Fedrich, EncyclopaediaBritanica, Vol.
XIII. (Chicago: William Benton Publisher, 1969),
880.
114 Karl W. Deutch, Encyclopaedia Americana,
Vol. XVII. (Danbury: Grolier Inc., 1967), 224 .
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Authority is the supreme seat of
legitimation. It is sovereign and
independent. It is also the ultimate court
of punishment and reward, and the
source of creation (legislation) and
annulment. Whereas authority is the
right to lead and command, power is the
supreme legitimate force. Power
obliges people to obey the will
expressed by authority. The confusion
that has always reigned among certain
writers derives from the fact that Islam
has not evolved a term of its own to
specifically designate authority
(auctoritas). Various expressions such
as al-amr(QS 7:54), al-hukm (QS
12:40,28:88), al-mulk (QS 4:54) have
been used in the Holy Qur’anto
designate authority. The same words
have been likewise applied to power
(Potestas). Although these Qur’anic
verses confirmed that ultimate authority
belongs to God alone, however, God’s
authority cannot operate in the human
society as He himself cannot become an
immediate ruler in the political
connotation.115For that reason we also
found that besides the Qur’an
emphasizing the sovereignty of God, at
the same time it repeatedly refers to
man as His vicegerent (khali>fah) on
earth (QS 2:30; 7:74; 7:129). This
explains to us that the concept of
authority which belongs to God
according to its classical concept has
been replaced by the concept of
vicegerency (khali>fah)of God. In line
115 LukmanThaib, Political System of Islam, (Kuala
Lumpur: Amal Publisher, 1994), 32.
with this line of reasoning, a famous
Qur’anic commentator al-Alusi said:
“The rule of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)
is in fact, the rule of God. After the
Prophet, his ummah (Muslim
community) succeeds to power to
rule”.116 However, the Muslim
community (Ummah) places itself
under self-limitation by declaring
individually as well as collectively the
moral sovereignty of God. Hence,
according to Islamic theory, the
sovereign power or authority is
delegated by God to the Muslim
community (Ummah) as a trust. The
Ummah can therefore legitimately
exercise this delegated authority only in
accordance with His will (the
shari>’ah).
It is very clear that political
authority on earth is a gift to the
Muslim community as God’s vicegerent
(khali>fah), but it is a sacred trust to be
exercised by rulers of the Muslim
community for implementing the will
of God (shari>’ah) for the betterment
of the Muslim community at large.
Hence, it is legitimate only when
exercised within the bounds and in
accordance with the principles of
justice and equality as set forth in the
Qur’an. Based on thisreasoning,
according to al-Ghannousyi, the
legitimacy of the Islamic state can be
derived from two primary sources: the
116Shiha>b al-Di>n Mahmu>d  al-Baghda>di  al-
Alu>si, Ru>h al-Ma’a>ni  fi>Tafsi>r al-Qur’a>n
al-Kari>m,Vol. 2. (Cairo: Matba’ah al-Munirah,
1965), 176.
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revelation as represented in the Qur’an
and Sunnah (al-Nass), and the second
source of legitimacy is popular
consultation(Shu>ra>). To al-
Ghannousyi, the authority of the
Islamic law (shari>’ah) surpasses any
other authorities in the Islamic state,
and its supremacy as the source of
legitimacy is unquestionable.117 To al-
Ghannousyi the Shari>’ah and
Syu>raare inextricably linked. It is the
Ummah that collectively deputises for
God in implementing His will
(shari>’ah) and is, therefore,
accountable to Him alone. The Muslim
community thus establishes a state
whose government is accountable to it
i.e., the Muslim community (Ummah)
delegates to the Islamic government the
authority to implement policies in
accordance and in full concordance
with the shari>’ah. The community
also exercises its supreme authority
over government through popular
consultation (Shu>ra>).
Al-Ghannousyi argued that
Muslims can use mechanisms of
Western democracy to develop the
concept of popular consultation in
Islam (Shu>ra>) in order to produce an
authentic Islamic form of democratic
government.118 He hoped that an
Islamic model of democracy which is
compatible with the shari>’ah and
capable of shielding the citizens against
117 Rashid Ghannousyi, “The Basic Principles of
an Islamic State”.
118 Rashid Ghannousyi, “The Basic Principles of
an Islamic State”.
injustice and despotism would emerge
one day. However, he acknowledged
that the transition to democracy in the
Muslim world, particularly the Arab
World, is hindered by a number of
obstacles. Foremost among these
obstacles are the project of
secularization, the territorial state, the
new world order and the rejectionist
attitude toward democracy espoused by
some Islamic groups.
C. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertion of his
critics, al-Ghannousyi considered
revelation (al-Nass)  to be the ultimate
frame of reference for his ideas. As a
thinker and an activist it seems that his
primary concern has been to find
solutions to the sufferings of his
country, Tunisia, and other Muslim
countries which have been afflicted by
despotic and totalitarian systems of
government. He argued that democracy
is the solution for the problem of
despotism. However, he treated
democracy not as an ideology that
could be imported  and copied by
Muslim countries, but as a tool or set of
mechanisms for electing, checking,
dismissing the government of the day
and for protecting the civil liberties and
the basic rights of citizens. Al-
Ghannousyi used the theory of faragh
(separation theory) to rebut the
Islamists’ rejection of democracy. He
rejected the widely accepted
assumption by Western writers that
both secularism and modernism are
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essential prerequisites of democracy.
One dilemma concerning Islam
and democracy is the reluctance
towards human made laws. Religious
forces are often eager to promote the
Islamic law (shari>’ah) as a sufficient
political and legal system. This stand is
obviously hindering the formation of
democratic politics due to a negative
attitude towards more modern
solutions. In his opinion, the Qur’an
and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH)
is God’s final revelation to the people,
and accordingly this wisdom is
complete.One has to agree that the way
we view democracy today is a result of
modern developments and knowledge.
Accordingly, if arguing that an Islamic
system based on shari>’ah is
democratic, one would assume that this
system is open for modern adjustment.
Among Islamists one can find
spokespersons for modern adjustments.
Extensive use of interpretation
(ijtiha>d) is the solution they offer.
These groups are often more willing to
change the political system than those
in power. However, many Islamists are
not planning to change the system
towards a democratic one,and those
who are promoting democratization
face the problem that few believe their
efforts to be sincere.
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